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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION
NO. 222,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

,V. S. HATCH COMPANY,

10943

A GTAH CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 222
Appeal from Judgment of District Court of Davis County
Judge Parley E. No1-seth, Presiding

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a money judgment in favor
of defendant-respondent pursuant to its counterclaim
against the plaintiff-appellant.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
This case was initiated by Teamsters Local Union
No. 222 for and on behalf of Kendel S. Twitchell and
other employees of defendant, W. S. Hatch Company,
for the payment to such employees by the defendant
of certain health and welfare and vacation benefits.
Defendant counterclaimed against the Union seeking recovery of $1567.50 which it claimed it had paid
the Union in error because of an alleged unlawful demand made to the Company by the Union.
lly the time the matter came on for trial, all issues
had been resolved between the parties except the
Twitchell matter and defendant's counterclaim. The
Trial Court entered judgment in favor of defendant
Hatch on the Twitchell issue, and the plaintiff did
not appeal that decision. The lower court also held in
favor of the defendant and counterclaimant and against
plaintiff on the issues raised in the counterclaim, and
rendered judgment against plaintiff in the sum of
$1567.50. As to this part of the judgment, plaintiff
appeals, following a denial of its motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 16, 1961, the parties to th~
suit entered into a collective bargaining agreement
which provided in Article XX, Section 2, that:
"Effective October l, 1961, the Company shall
contribute to a jointly administered trust fund
2

the sum of $16.50 per month for each regular
employee covered by this agreement who has
worked eighty ( 80) hours or more in the preceding month and thereafter shall continue to
pay $16.50 for each such employee who works
eighty ( 80) hours or more during each preceding month for the duration of this agreement."
Article XXXI of the agreement reads:
"This agreement shall be effective October

16, 1961 to September 30, 1964

* * * *"

Prior to the agreement, the parties had entered
into similar agreements, the last of which had termiua ted June 30, 1961, during which tiine Hatch had
paid $11.88 per month for each employee. The particular Trust Fund to which the money was contributed
was the Utah-Idaho Teamsters Security Fund, a Trust
jointly and equally administered by Management and
Labor representatives. Hatch had made health and
welfare contributions to this Trust Fund pursuant to
these prior agreements, and had also made payments
into the Trust for the benefit of its employees during
periods when there were no such agreements, for example, the period between June 30, 1961 and October
1, 1961. During this particular interim period between
agreements, Hatch paid an amount required by the
terms of the agreement then recently expired. The
Trust accepted the contributions, and the employees
were made eligible and enjoyed the benefits therefrom,
eyeu though there was no collective bargaining agreement to support such payments.
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At the conclusion of each calendar month, Hatch
determined which of its employees had worked the
required number of hours and then sent the appropriate
sum of money to the Trust Fund for each such eligible
employee. The employees were then given proper eligibility and insurance coverage for the month immedi·
ately following the month that the employees worked.
It was impossible, of course, to determine the hours
worked during any given month until the end of that
month.
Defendant's Exhibit 1 is a series of 36 checks,
beginning with a check dated October 9, 1961, in the
sum of $1152.36 and ending with a check dated September 14, 1964, in the sum of $1584.00. The fourth
check in this series of 36 checks is dated January 15,
1962, in the sum of $1094.94. This check was an adjustment check which supplemented payments for the previous months. Prior to the October 16, 1961 agreement
Hatch had been paying under the old rate of $11.88
per employee per month. Under the new contract, the
rate was $16.50 per month. This fourth check was an
adjustment payment that paid up the difference between the old and the new rates. (Tr. 70-72). w·hen
defendant introduced Exhibit 1, it failed to include
in the exhibit the January payment for December,
1961 hours, and, by mistake, substituted the said adjustment check. The check that should have been included
as the fourth payment was in the sum of $807.64.
(Tr. 72).
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wing is a list of checks contributed by
l'rust Fund for hours worked since Sepn. This list includes all the checks in
.xhibit 1 plus the $807.64 check above
:ck 4 below) , and adds the check marked
~xhibit 4 (see check 37 below).
Date of
Check

Amount of
Check

$1152.36
997.92
795.96
807.84

10-9-()1

11-15-61
12-12-61
Jan. 62

Month of
Eligibility
and Benefits

Oct. 61
Nov. 61
Dec. 61
Jan. 62

Lent check dated Jan. 15, 1962 in sum of
1469.16
1204.50
1254.00
1452.00
1468.50
1600.50
1534.50
1534.50
1452.00
1369.50
1254.00

2-26-62
;J-15-62
.J.-IG-62
5-17-62
6-14-62
7-25-62
8-17-62
9-17-62
10-12-62
11-14-62
12-13-62
1-10-63
2-13-63
.'3-13-63
4;-11-63
5-15-63
6-13-63
7-16-6.'3
R-12-613
0-13-63

1089.00

1105.50
1188.00
1287.00
1402.50
1534.50
1534.50
1485.00
1353.00
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Feb. 62
March 62
April 62
May62
June 62
July 62
Aug. 62
Sept. 62
Oct. 62
Nov. 62
Dec. 62
Jan.63
Feb. 63
March 63
April 63
May63
June 63
July 63
Aug. 63
Sept. 63

Month of
Hours Worked
~5.

Sept. 63

:.w. Oct. 63

'l.7. Nov. 63

28. Dec. 63
Jan. 64
30. Feb. 64
31. Mar. 64
32. Apr. 64
33. May 64
34. June 64
; ;5. July 64
:J6. Aug. 64
37. Sept. 64
~9.

Date of
Check

Amount of
Check

10-11-63
11-9-63
11-29-63
1-1-64
2-3-64
3-27-64

1287.00
1221.00
1171.50
1171.50
1270.50
1105.50
1301.85
1965.15
1452.00
1617.00
1567.50
1584.00
1567.50

.J.-23-64

5-27-64
7-10-64
8-10-64
8-14-64
9-14-64
12-19-64

Month of
Eligibility
and Benefits

Oct. 63
Nov. 63
Dec. 63
Jan. 64
Feb. 64
Mar.64
Apr. 64
May64
June 64
July 64
Aug. 64
Sept. 64
Oct. 64

The payment by Hatch of the 37th check above
in the sum of $1567.50 was not paid to appellant, Local
No. 222, but was paid to the Utah-Idaho Teamsters
Security Fund, and such payment was the basis for
Hatch's counterclaim against appellant. The counter·
claim was filed on or about June 11, 1965, a period of

six months after it was paid to the Trust Fund, durin,q
which time the Trust Fund furnished health and wel·
fare benefits to Hatch' s employees for sickness they
and their families suffered in October, 1964. These

October benefits were made available to them as a
result of Hatch's making such payment. (Tr. 87-88,
90-91).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PAYl\IENT OF $1567.50 BY RESPONDJ<~NT, HATCH CO., TO THE UTAH-IDAHO
TEAMSTERS SECURITY F'UND VV AS A
LA\VFUL PAYl\'IENT PURSUANT TO A
WRITTEN AGREEMENT.
As support of the judgment herein, the trial court
made a finding that "Teamsters Local Union No. 222
made an unlawful demand for contributions under
the health and welfare provisions of said labor agreemeut covering payment for the month of October,
rnfi:3, a month not covered by said labor agreement,"
~d;d that "on or about December 19, 1964, defendant
made payment of $1567.50 to said plaintiff pursuant
to said demand."
The court's finding that contributions of $1567.50
paid December 19, 1964, were for the month of October
(loes not enlighten us as to whether it refers to hours
worked in October or to benefits received in October.
We submit that its finding that the contribution of
~1567.50 was pursuant to an unlawful demand is a
condusion of law rather than a finding of fact because
it is based on the court's interpretation of the language
of Article XX, Section 2 of the agreement. If it is
a finding of fact it is not supported by any evidence,
because the evidence is that this payment was for hours
Worked by the employees in September 1964. (Tr. 92).
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Both parties to this law suit appear to agree that
the Agreement meant that the new rate of $16.50 per
month (the previous rate had been $11.88 per month)
was to apply to hours worked in September, 1961.
Thus, after the hours worked in September, 1961 were
counted, the company then determined how many men
had worked eighty (80) hours in September, 1961,
and under the new Agreement "effective October 1,
1961", paid $16.50 for each such employee covered by
the Agreement, and such employees were then eligible
for benefits beginning October 1, 1961.
The question now arises whether the hours worked
by the men in September, 1964, are included in the
agreement or excluded. The Agreement is effective
"through September 30, 1964".
According to the interpretation of the language
of the Agreement by the trial court, the employees
were not entitled to health and welfare benefits for
hours they worked in September, 1964, the theory being
that health and welfare benefits under the Agreement
are necessarily limited to a period of 36 months.
1

The Agreement, however, does not speak in terms1 )
of months, but in terms of dates. The previous Agreement between the parties had expired June 30, 1961,
and the parties had been negotiating without a success·
ful conclusion until October 16, 1961, a period of 31/z
months.
It seems to us that the rules of construction and
interpretation are violated to read into the dates set
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forth in the Agreement a limit of 36 months when
to do so deprives the employees of a most important
fringe benefit for them and their families for hours that
they worked in September, 1964, a month specifically
included in the Agreement. Such a view holds that
because the employees had health and welfare benefits
in October, 1961, they were precluded from such benefits in October, 1964, for hours worked in September,
1964 simply because they would thus get benefits for
37 months under the agreement rather than 36 months.
\Ve believe that the Agreement does not so read, that
the language that the "agreement shall be effective
"' * * through September 30, 1964", means that the
men would receive all benefits under the contract, including full credit for hours worked toward health and
welfare benefits during September, 1964.
There is nothing in the record or the language
of the Agreement to justify the Trial Court's restrictive interpretation. On the contrary, during the interim
period between contracts, a period of three and a half
months, the Company continued, voluntarily, to pay
health and welfare contributions into the Trust Fund.
"Tith this in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that
the language of the Agreement fairly expresses the
view that the new rate of contribution under the new
Agreement would be applied back to October 1, 1961
for hours already worked in September 1961, even
though the Agreement was not reached until October
16, 1961. And that having so provided, it was not
thereby intended to deprive the employees of health
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and welfare benefits for hours they would work iu
September, 1964 merely because the benefits and eligibility faerefor would not be received until October,
HHJ-li. The Agreement" in fact, refers to such a lay montl1
zchen it spcai,-s of payments for hours worked "in the
precediny month''.
At the time the parties negotiated and executed
the Agreement they, we may well believe, did not hare
it in mind to deprive the employees of an important
"fringe" benefit for hours they would work during
the last month of the Agreement. 'fhe Record reveals
that the employees who were the recipients of these
benefits went on strike against the Respondent early
in October, 1964. (Tr. 65). In view of which, it is not
u11reasonable to conclude that the Respondent looked
at the Agreement in a more restrictive light than there·
tofore, and then developed a theory that the benefits
were necessarily limited to a period of 36 months. "A
contract, being construed, should be viewed prospectively as the parties viewed it at the time of its execution, and not from a retrospective point of view". 17
Am. Jur. 2d 624 (para. 240).
Since the Agreement speaks iu terms of dates rather
than in terms of numbers of months, and in terms that
[i;'e cle2 r :ff•<l unambiguous to the effect that the em·
ployees were to be giYen all contract benefits for hours
~rnrked by them in September, 1964, we submit that
there was no legal basis for an interpretation of the
language by the- trial court contrary to its expressed
meaning.
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"As a general rule, where the terms of a writing
are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, since the only office of judicial construction
is to remove doubt and uncertainty". (17 Am. Jur.
2d 625 (para. 241).

POINT II
EVEN IF THE PAYMENT REFERRED
TO IN POINT I WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
AN AGREEMENT, IT WAS, NEVERTHELESS, A LAWFUL AND VOLUNTARY PAYMENT FOR '¥HICH FULL BENEFITS
YVERE RECEIVED.
If there had not been a written agreement to support the final payment of $1567.50 as the respondent
contends, it was, nevertheless, a lawful and voluntary
payment even though pursuant to a demand letter, not
made under protest, and for which full eligibility and
benefits were received by Hatch's employees. (Tr. 9091).

A "termination of a contract is nullified by the
subsequent acceptance of benefits growing out of the
contract". 17 Am. J ur. 2d 961 (para. 489) . Even if
Hatch had paid the $1567.50 pursuant to a fraudulent
inducement by Appellant, instead of a letter demanding it to honor its contract obligations as was the case
here, Hatch would not be permitted to rescind the
transaction without first restoring the benefit it had
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received therefrom. See Brennan v. National Equitable
Investment Co., 247 N.Y. 486, 160 N.E. 924; Neet
v. Holmes, 25 Cal. 2d 447, 154 P2d 854, 860.
If Local Union 222 had been in error when it
wrote the letter demanding: that Hatch make its final
payment to the Trust Fund for September, 1964 hours
worked, such an error or miscalculation gives rise to
no legal or equitable rule or doctrine that would permit
Hatch to make such payment, get full benefit therefrom, then receive the payment back. Yet, this is precisely the ruling that Hatch has obtained from the
Trial Court in this case, and from which appellant is
11ow seeking relief.

POINT III
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT IS IN ERROR BECAUSE IT IS
BASED ON THE ERRONEOUS FACTUAL
PRE.LUISE THAT THE RESPONDENT, ,V. S.
HATCH COMP ANY, PAID THE $1567.50 TO
THE APPELLANT, YVHEN, IN FACT, IT
YVAS PAID TO THE UTAH-IDAHO TEAM·
STERS SECURITY FUND.
A material finding of fact upon which the judgment of appellant is based is that "on or about December 19, 1964, defendant made payment of $1567.50
to said plaintiff".
The onlv evidence as to whom the $1567.50 was
paid is that it was paid by Hatch to the Utah-Idaho
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ity .Fund and not to the plaintiffters Local Union No. 222. The said
'rust administered by Trustees equally
tanagement and labor and is a legal
)arated from Local Union 222. The
mployees of many employers in Utah
1om the employees of W. S. Hatch
nly a small part. Local 222 was not
:he Trust. This Trust is a Trust set
the requirements of Section 302 of
1 Labor Management Relations Act
les referred to as the Taft-Hartley
provides criminal penalties for emmoney to a representative of any of
Local 222 was such a representative
,s precluded from receiving the $1,iintly managed trusts are authorized
::> that it is lawful for an employer to
mch trusts for certain beneficial uses
loyees and thereby not be in violation
law proscribing such payments to a

fact that the payment of the $1567.50
tployer Hatch directly to the Trust
:nefit of its employees (defendant's
id Tr. 64) , and there is no evidence
md in spite of the fact that had such
ade to appellant, Teamsters Local
re placed Hatch in criminal violation
ti Statute, the trial court, nevertheless,
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made the material finding of fact that "on or about
December 19, 1964, defendant made payment to plaintiff [Teamsters Local 222] * * * *".
Since the Union was a party to the collective bargaining agreement that provided that Hatch make
contributions into the Trust Fund for the benefit of
Hatch's employees, the Trial Court may have misunderstood the Union's role as an advocate for Hatch's
employees when it wrote the letter demanding final
payment by Hatch to the Trust, and when it defended
the counterclaim of Hatch against the Union on the
issue of the validity of the final payment to the Trust.
If Hatch wanted a judgment for the return of the
money it paid to the Trust, it was essential that Hatch
bring the Trust into court as a third party defendant
when it counterclaimed. During the trial it was suggested by Hatch that it was appellant's obligation to bring
the Trust in as a party. But appellant wasn't seeking
anything from the Trust. Hatch was after money it
had paid the Trust and it was therefore Hatch's re·
sponsibility to bring into court as parties whomever
it needed to perfect its case, if it had one.
But the fact is that the Trust, not the union, re·
ceived the payment in question, and the Trial Court's
finding to the contrary is clearly a factual error with·
out any evidentiary support whatsoever. Even if ap·
pellant were not fortified by its Points I and II here·
in, any judgment in favor of Hatch must necessarily
be against the proper party, the one who received the
14

money. On this point alone the judgment against the
appellant should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The judgment against appellant is in error because the payment of $1567.50 to the Utah-Idaho
Teamsters Security Fund was pursuant to the written
collective bargaining agreement of October 16, 1961;
it was a payment, whether paid under a written agreement or not, for which respondent obtained full value;
and because even if respondent's counterclaim had any
substantive merit, appellant did not receive the money,
and it is not the party against whom such a claim should
be made, nor a judgment rendered.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PARK SMOOT
Attorney for Appellant
847 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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